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with a continuum of traders and differential information. We show that if the
economy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner
(1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations
coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak
fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an
associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is
the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the properties of core and competitive allo-
cations in large exchange economies with differential information. Radner (1968
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and 1982) introduces a model of an exchange economy with differential informa-
tion in which every trader is characterized by a state dependent utility function,
a random initial endowment, an information partition, and a prior belief. In this
framework, traders arrange contingent contracts for trading commodities before
they obtain any information about the realized state of nature. Radner (1968)
extends the notion of Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium to this model. In
the definition of competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner), the informa-
tion of an agent places a restriction on his feasible trades (i.e., his budget set):
better information allows for more contingent trades (i.e., enlarges the agent’s
budget set). Thus, in a Radner competitive equilibrium better informed agents
are generally, ceteris paribus, better off (and they are never worse off) than those
with worse information; i.e., a competitive equilibrium rewards the information
advantage of a trader.
We consider two period Radner-type economies with a finite number of states
of nature and a continuum of traders. In these economies there is uncertainty
about the state of nature. In the first period traders arrange contracts that may
be contingent on the realized state of nature in the second period. Consumption
takes place in the second period. We provide a straightforward extension to
these economies of the notion of Radner competitive equilibrium, and examine
conditions that guarantee its existence. Also we study the set of core allocations in
these economies. It is well known that in perfectly competitive economies (that is,
when no individual can affect the overall outcome) with complete information
the core coincides with the set of competitive allocations (see, e.g., Aumann,
1964). In an economy with differential information, the set of allocations that a
coalition can block depends upon the initial information and the communication
opportunities of the members of the coalition. Thus, several alternative notions
of core can be considered.
Yannelis (1991) introduces the notion of private core, and shows that under
appropriate assumptions the private core of an economy is non-empty. In the
private core the set of feasible allocations for a blocking coalition must involve
a net trade of each member of the coalition that is measurable with respect to
his information partition. The private core has some interesting properties: Kout-
sougeras and Yannelis (1993) show that if there is a finite number of traders, the
private core is coalitionally incentive compatible–see Section 4 in Koutsougeras
and Yannelis (1993). Also the private core rewards the information advantage of
a trader–see Section 5 in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), and the discussion
below.
Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), see also Allen (1991), introduce the notion
of weak fine core, a version of Wilson’s (1978) fine core, and showed that this
core is non-empty. In the definition of the weak fine core blocking net trades are
measurable with respect to the joint partition of all the members of the coalition,
but in addition all net trades are measurable with respect to the joint partition of
all the traders.
In our context, the private core is the appropriate notion of core when the
traders have no access to any communication system, and therefore cannot ex-
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change information. The weak fine core is the appropriate notion of core when
the traders have access to a communication system that allows them to fully share
their information, and under the maintained assumption of perfect competition
(that is, assuming that individuals are also “small” from the point of view of
information). We study the relations of these cores and the set of competitive
allocations in the economies described above, with a continuum of traders and
differential information.
First we establish conditions under which a Radner competitive equilibrium
exists: we show that if an economy is irreducible, and if the traders’ utility
functions are continuous and increasing, then an equilibrium exists. The exis-
tence of competitive equilibrium in economies with a continuum of traders and
complete information was studied in Aumann (1966) and Hildenbrand (1970).
We establish existence of equilibrium using general results from Hildenbrand
(1974). The irreducibility condition was introduced by Mckenzie (1959) for ex-
change economies with a finite number of traders, and it has been extended to
economies with a continuum of traders by Hildenbrand (1974). It expresses the
idea that the endowment of every coalition, if added to the allocation of the
complementary coalition, can be used to improve the welfare of every member
of the complementary coalition. We show that an economy is irreducible if, for
example, the initial endowment of every trader is strictly positive at each state
of nature.
Next we show that if an economy is irreducible, then the private core of
the economy coincides with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions. Thus, private core allocations reward the information advantage of a trader.
We provide simple examples which show that this result may not hold for re-
ducible economies. For the weak fine core, we show that under mild assumptions
it coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric
information economy. This associated economy is identical to the original econ-
omy, except for the traders’ information, which is the joint information of all
the traders in the original economy. Specifically, this result holds if the traders’
utility functions are continuous and strictly increasing, and if for every trader
there is a state of nature at which his initial endowment is non-zero. Moreover,
the result holds whether or not the economy is irreducible.
Thus, whereas private core allocations reward the information advantage of a
trader, when the possibility of sharing information is introduced the information
advantage is worthless; e.g., if two traders A and B have identical character-
istics, except that A is better informed than B (i.e., A’s information partition
is finer than B’s) then in a private core allocation trader A may be better off
than trader B; in a weak fine core allocation, however, both traders are equally
well off (because a weak fine core allocation is a competitive allocation of the
associated symmetric information economy). (In sharp contrasts to this result,
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1999) have shown that the weak fine bargaining set
contains allocations that are not competitive in the associated symmetric infor-
mation economy, which suggests that the weak fine bargaining set discriminates
in favor of better informed agents.)
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In
Section 3 we discuss the existence of competitive equilibrium (in the sense of
Radner). In Section 4 we prove the equivalence between competitive and private
core allocations. Finally, in Section 5 we establish the equivalence of the weak
fine core and the set of competitive allocations of the associated symmetric
information economy.
2 The model
We consider a Radner-type exchange economy E with differential information
(e.g., Radner, 1968, 1982). The commodity space is l+. The space of traders is
a measure space (T , Σ, µ), where T is a set (the set of traders), Σ is a σ-field
of subsets of T (the set of coalitions), and µ is a non-atomic measure on Σ. The
economy extends over two time periods, τ = 0, 1. Consumption takes place at
τ = 1. At τ = 0 there is uncertainty over the state of nature; in this period traders
arrange contracts that may be contingent on the realized state of nature at τ = 1.
There is a finite space of states of nature, denoted by Ω. At τ = 1 traders do not
necessarily know which state of nature ω ∈ Ω actually occurred, although they
know their own endowments, and may also have some additional information
about the state of nature. We do not assume, however, that traders know their
utility function (see below).
The information of a trader t ∈ T is described by a partition Πt of Ω. We
denote by F t the field generated by Πt . If ω is the true state of the economy
at τ = 1, trader t observes the member of Πt which contains ω. Every trader
t ∈ T has a probability measure qt on Ω which represents his prior beliefs.
The preferences of a trader t ∈ T are represented by a state dependent utility
function, ut : Ω × l+ →  such that for every (t , x ) ∈ T × l+, the mapping
(t , x ) → ut (ω, x ) is Σ ×B measurable, where ω is a fixed member of Ω, and
B is the σ-field of Borel subsets of l+. If x is a random bundle (i.e., a function
from Ω to l+) we denote by ht (x ) the expected utility from x of trader t ∈ T .
That is
ht (x ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
qt (ω)ut (ω, x (ω)).
An assignment is a function x : T × Ω → l+ such that for every ω ∈ Ω
the function x(·, ω) is µ-integrable on T . There is a fixed initial assignment e;
e(t , ω) represents the initial endowment density of trader t ∈ T in the state of
nature ω ∈ Ω. We assume that for almost every t ∈ T the function e(t , ·) is
F t -measurable.
Throughout the paper we use the following notations. For two vectors x =
(x1, . . . , xl ) and y = (y1, . . . , yl ) in l we write x ≥ y when xk ≥ yk for all
1 ≤ k ≤ l , x > y when x ≥ y and x /= y , and x  y when xk > yk for all
1 ≤ k ≤ l .
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3 Competitive equilibrium
In this section we extend Radner’s (1982) definition of competitive equilibrium
to our model (see Radner, 1982, Section 3.4), and discuss conditions under which
its existence can be guaranteed. Throughout the rest of the paper, an economy
E is an atomless economy with differential information as described in Section
2.
A private allocation for an economy E is an assignment x such that
(3.1) for almost all t ∈ T the function x(t , ·) is F t -measurable, and
(3.2) ∫T x(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫T e(t , ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω.
A price system is a non-zero function p : Ω → l+. Let t ∈ T and let Mt
be the set of all F t -measurable functions from Ω to l+. For a price system p,
define the budget set of t by
Bt (p) =
{
x | x ∈ Mt and
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x (ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · e(t , ω)
}
.
A competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner) for an economy E is a
pair (p, x) where p is a price system and x is private allocation such that
(3.3) for almost all t ∈ T the function x(t , ·) maximizes ht on Bt (p), and
(3.4) ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · ∫T x(t , ω)dµ = ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · ∫T e(t , ω)dµ.
A competitive allocation is a private allocation x for which there exists a price
system p such that (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium.
In the literature, condition (3.2) in the definition of a private allocation is
written usually with (strict) equality; see, e.g., Radner (1968), Krasa and Yannelis
(1994), Allen (1997). Here we follow Radner (1982) who noted that the total
amount to be disposed of might not be measurable with respect to the information
partition of a single agent. Einy and Shitovitz (1999) provide an example of an
economy with differential information which has a competitive equilibrium, but
if the inequality (3.2) in the definition of a private allocation is replaced with an
equality, then the economy does not have a competitive equilibrium where all
prices are non-negative–see Example 2.1 in Einy and Shitovitz (1999). Condition
(3.4) ensures that in a competitive equilibrium if a commodity is in excess supply
its price is zero. This condition is redundant as it is implied by Walras’ Law,
which is satisfied in our framework. Nevertheless we include it to facilitate
comparison to Radner’s (1982) definition.
A function u : l+ →  is (strictly) increasing if for all x , y ∈ l+, (x > y)
x  y implies u(x ) > u(y).
Throughout the paper we will often refer to the following conditions.
(A.1) For every ω ∈ Ω we have ∫T e(t , ω)dµ 0.
(A.2) For almost all t ∈ T and for every ω ∈ Ω, the function ut (ω, ·) is continuous
and increasing on l+.
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(A.3) Irreducibility: for every private allocation x and for every two disjoint
coalitions T1,T2 ∈ Σ such that µ(T1) > 0, µ(T2) > 0, and T1 ∪ T2 = T , there
exists an assignment y such that y(t , ·) ∈ Mt for almost all t ∈ T2, and such that
(A.3.1) ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ T2, and
(A.3.2) for all ω ∈ Ω: ∫T1 e(t , ω)dµ + ∫T2 x(t , ω)dµ ≥ ∫T2 y(t , ω)dµ.
Condition (A.3), Irreducibility, was introduced in McKenzie (1959) for economies
with a finite number of traders, and was extended for atomless economies by
Hildenbrand (see Hildenbrand, 1974, pp. 143, 214). It expresses the idea that the
endowment of every coalition is desired. Our definition is a variant of Hilden-
brand’s (1974).
Proposition 3.1. Assume that an economy E satisfies assumption (A.2). If for
almost every t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω we have e(t , ω)  0, then E satisfies
Condition (A.3) (Irreducibility).
Proof. Assume that e(t , ω)  0 for almost every t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω. Let x be
a private allocation in E , and let T1,T2 ∈ Σ be two disjoint coalitions such that
µ(T1) > 0 and µ(T2) > 0, and T1 ∪ T2 = T . Then for all ω ∈ Ω we have∫
T1
e(t , ω)dµ 0.
Let a ∈ l+ be such that µ(T2)a  0, and such that for all ω ∈ Ω we have∫
T1
e(t , ω)dµ ≥ µ(T2)a.
Define y : T ×Ω → l+ by
y(t , ω) =
{
0 t ∈ T1,
x(t , ω) + a t ∈ T2.
Then for all t ∈ T2, y(t , ·) ∈ Mt . Since for almost all t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω,
ut (ω, ·) is increasing, we have
ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)),
for almost all t ∈ T2. From the choice of a it is clear that (A.3.2) holds for x
and y. 
A quasi equilibrium for the economy E is a pair (p, x), where p is a price
system and x is a private allocation, such that
(3.5) for almost all t ∈ T , either ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · e(t , ω) = 0, or the function x(t , ·)
maximizes ht on Bt (p), and
(3.6) ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · ∫T x(t , ω)dµ = ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · ∫T e(t , ω)dµ.
Proposition 3.2. If an economy E satisfies conditions (A.1)− (A.3), then every
quasi equilibrium of E is a competitive equilibrium.
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Proof. Proposition 3.2 is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 in Hildenbrand
(1974), p. 214, when for t ∈ T the consumption sets are Mt , the utility functions
are ht , and the production sets are (l−)Ω . 
Theorem A. If an economy E satisfies assumptions (A.1) − (A.3) then it has a
competitive equilibrium.
Proof. First note that our definition of quasi equilibrium is a special case of
Hildenbrand’s (1970, 1974) definition of quasi equilibrium for a coalition pro-
duction economy where for t ∈ T the consumption sets are Mt , the utility func-
tions are ht , and the production sets are (l−)Ω (see Hildenbrand, 1970, Section
2, p. 611). Therefore by Theorem 2 in Hildenbrand (1970), an economy E has
a quasi equilibrium. Moreover, by Proposition 3.2 any quasi-equilibrium of E
is a competitive equilibrium of E . 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1 and The-
orem A.
Corollary 3.3. If an economy E satisfies (A.1), (A.2), and in addition for every
ω ∈ Ω and almost all t ∈ T we have e(t , ω)  0, then E has a competitive
equilibrium.
4 The private core
In this section we extend the definition of private core introduced in Yannelis
(1991) to our economy, and show that under conditions (A.1)− (A.3) the set of
competitive allocations of the economy coincides with the set of private core
allocations.
An assignment x is a private core allocation for the economy E if
(4.1) x is a private allocation, and
(4.2) there do not exist a coalition S ∈ Σ and an assignment y such that
(4.2.1) µ(S ) > 0,
(4.2.2) y(t , ·) is F t -measurable for all t ∈ S ,
(4.2.3) ∫S y(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫S e(t , ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω, and
(4.2.4) ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ S .
The private core of an economy E is the set of all private core allocations of
E .
Proposition 4.1. Every competitive allocation of an economy E is a private core
allocation of E .
Proof. Proposition 4.1 is a special case of Proposition 2 in Hildenbrand (1974),
p. 216. 
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Theorem B. Under assumptions (A.1) − (A.3) the set of competitive allocations
of an economy E coincides with the private core of E .
Proof. By Proposition (4.1) it suffices to show that every private core allocation
in E is a competitive allocation. Let x be a private core allocation in E . By
Theorem 1 in Hildenbrand (1974), p. 216, there is a price system p such that
(p, x) is a quasi equilibrium for E . By Proposition 3.2 we obtain that (p, x) is a
competitive equilibrium for E .
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1 and The-
orem B.
Corollary 4.2. If an economy E satisfies (A.1), (A.2), and in addition for every
ω ∈ Ω and almost all t ∈ T we have e(t , ω)  0, then the set of competitive
allocations of E coincides with the private core of E .
We now give an example of an atomless “reducible” economy (i.e., it does
not satisfy Condition (A.3)) with complete information satisfying (A.1) and (A.2)
which has a non-empty core, but does not have a competitive equilibrium. Also
this example shows that the private core may not satisfy the Equal Treatment
Property when the economy is “reducible.”
Example 4.3. Consider an atomless economy E in which the space of traders
is ([0, 2],B , λ), where B is the σ-field of Borel subsets of [0, 2] and λ is
the Lebesgue measure. Traders have complete information, and the commodity
space is 2+. Every trader t ∈ T1 = [0, 1] has an initial endowment e(t) =
(1, 0) and utility function u1(x , y) = x , whereas each trader t ∈ T2 = (1, 2] has
initial endowment e(t) = (1, 1) and utility function u2(x , y) = y . The core of the
economy E consists of all allocations x such that
ut (x(t)) =
{
α(t) t ∈ T1,
1 t ∈ T2,
where α : T1 → + is an integrable function such that α(t) ≥ 1 for almost all
t ∈ T1, and
∫
T1 α(t)dλ ≤ 2. It is easy to see that every core allocation in E is a
quasi equilibrium allocation with price system p = (0, 1). However, the economy
E does not have a competitive equilibrium. It is worth noticing that the core of
this economy contains allocations that do not have the Equal Treatment Property.
In the following example we consider a reducible economy (i.e., it does
not satisfy Condition (A.3)) with asymmetric information in which the utility
functions of the traders are strictly increasing and strictly concave. The economy
does not have a competitive equilibrium, although its private core is non-empty
(it consists of the initial assignment).
Example 4.4. Consider an atomless economy E in which the space of traders
is ([0, 2],B , λ), where B is the σ-field of Borel subsets of [0, 2] and λ is
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the Lebesgue measure. The commodity space is 2+, and the space of states
of nature is Ω = {ω1, ω2} . The information partition of every trader t in the
interval T1 = [0, 1] is Π1 = {{ω1} , {ω2}} , his prior belief is q1 = ( 12 , 12 ), his
initial endowments are e(t , ω1) = (1, 0) and e(t , ω2) = (0, 1), and his utility
functions are ut (ω, (x , y)) =
√
x +
√y for all ω ∈ Ω. The information partition of
every trader t in the interval T2 = (1, 2] is Π2 = {{ω1, ω2}} , his prior belief is
q2 = ( 12 , 12 ), his initial endowments are e(t , ω1) = e(t , ω2) = (1, 1), and his utility
function is ut (ω, (x , y)) =
√
x +
√y , for all ω ∈ Ω. It is easy to see that the
economy does not have a competitive equilibrium. However, the unique private
core allocation is the initial assignment e. Note that (p, e), where p(ω1) = (0, 1)
and p(ω2) = (1, 0), is a quasi equilibrium for E .
5 The weak fine core
In this section we extend to our model the definition of “weak fine core” in-
troduced by Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) (see also Allen, 1991), and we
prove an equivalence theorem for this notion of core.
We first note that since Ω is a finite set, there is a finite number of different
information partitions. Let us be given an economy E , and denote by Π1, . . . , Πn
the n distinct information partitions of the traders. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let F i
be the field generated by Πi , and let
Ti = {t ∈ T | F t = F i} .
We assume that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n the set Ti is measurable and µ(Ti ) > 0.
If I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is a non-empty set, we denote by ∨i∈I F i the smallest field
which contains each F i , i ∈ I . If S ∈ Σ is a coalition with µ(S ) > 0, we
denote
I (S ) = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n and µ(S ∩ Ti ) > 0} .
An assignment x for the economy E is called a weak fine core allocation if
(5.1) for almost all t ∈ T the function x(t , ·) is ∨ni=1F i -measurable;
(5.2) for every ω ∈ Ω, ∫T x(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫T e(t , ω)dµ;
(5.3) there do not exist a coalition S ∈ Σ and an assignment y such that
(5.3.1) µ(S ) > 0,
(5.3.2) y(t , ·) is ∨i∈I (S )F i -measurable for almost all t ∈ S ,
(5.3.3) ∫S y(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫S e(t , ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω, and
(5.3.4) ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ S .
The weak fine core of E is defined as the set of all weak fine core allocations of
E .
We now introduce the following condition.
(A.4) If A ∈ ∨ni=1F i is non-empty, then qt (A) > 0 for almost all t ∈ T .
We denote by E ∗ an economy identical to E except for the information
fields of the traders, which for all t ∈ T is taken to be F ∗t =
∨n
i=1F i . Note
that the information in E ∗ is symmetric.
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In the proof of the following proposition we use a result of Vind (1972),
see also Proposition 7.3.2. in Mas-Colell (1985), which asserts that in atomless
economy (see Aumann, 1964) if an allocation is blocked, then the blocking
coalition can be chosen with a measure which is arbitrarily close to the measure
of the grand coalition.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A.1), (A.2) and (A.4), and
in addition for almost all t ∈ T and for every ω ∈ Ω the function ut (ω, ·) is
strictly increasing. Then the weak fine core of E coincides with the private core
of E ∗.
Proof. It is clear that every private core allocation in E ∗ is a weak fine core
allocation of E . We prove the converse. Let Π =
∨n
i=1 Πi (i.e., Π is the smallest
partition of Ω that refines each Πi ). Denote Π = {A1, ...,Ak}, and let X be the set
of all members of (l+)Ω which are
∨n
i=1F i -measurable. Then every member of
X is constant on every Aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k . Let the function α : X → kl+ be defined
by α(x ) = xˆ , where for 1 ≤ j ≤ k , xˆj = x (ωj ) for some ωj ∈ Aj . Note that α is
a one to one mapping from X onto kl+ . For every t ∈ T we define a function
ˆht : kl+ →  by ˆht (xˆ ) = ht (α−1(xˆ )). Then ˆht is continuous, and by (A.4) it is
strictly increasing. Consider now the complete information atomless economy Ê
in which the space of traders is (T , Σ, µ), the commodity space is kl+ , the initial
assignment is eˆ, where eˆ(t) = α(e(t , ·)) for all t ∈ T , and the utility function
of trader t is ˆht . Let y be a weak fine core allocation of E . Assume, contrary
to our claim, that y is not a private core allocation of E ∗. For every t ∈ T let
yˆ(t) = α(y(t , ·)). Then yˆ is not in the core of the economy Ê . Therefore by the
Theorem of Vind (1972), there exists a coalition S ∈ Σ and an assignment zˆ in





ˆht (zˆ(t)) > ˆht (yˆ(t)) for almost all t ∈ S . For every t ∈ T let z(t , ·) = α−1(zˆ(t)).
Then for every ω ∈ Ω we have∫
S




Since µ(S ) > µ(T ) − min{µ(T1), ..., µ(Tn )}, we have I (S ) = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
thus for all t ∈ T , z(t , ·) is ∨i∈I (S )F i -measurable.
For almost all t ∈ S we have
ht (z(t , ·)) = ˆht (zˆ(t)) > ˆht (yˆ(t)) = ht (y(t , ·)),
which contradicts the assumption that y is a weak fine core allocation of E . 
Lemma 5.2. Assume that an economy E satisfies the assumptions of Proposition
5.1, and in addition for almost every t ∈ T there is ω ∈ Ω such that e(t , ω) /= 0.
Then the economy E ∗is irreducible, i.e., it satisfies condition (A.3).
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Proof. Let x be a private allocation in E ∗, and let T1,T2 be two disjoint coalitions
in Σ such that T = T1 ∪ T2, and µ(T1) > 0, µ(T2) > 0. For every (t , ω) ∈ T ×Ω
let
y(t , ω) =
{
0 t ∈ T1,
x(t , ω) + 1µ(T2)
∫
T1 e(t , ω)dµ t ∈ T2.
Then for every t ∈ T , y(t , ·) is ∨ni=1F i -measurable. Since ut (ω, ·) is strictly
increasing for almost all t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω, and 1µ(T2)
∫
T1 e(t , ω)dµ > 0 for
some ω ∈ Ω, it follows from (A.4) that for almost every t ∈ T2
ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)).
Moreover, for all ω ∈ Ω we have∫
T1
e(t , ω)dµ +
∫
T2




Therefore E ∗ is irreducible. 
Theorem C. Assume that an economy E satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 5.2.
Then the weak fine core of E coincides with the set of competitive allocations of
E ∗.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem
B. 
We conclude with the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3. If an economy E satisfies the assumptions (A.1), (A.2), and in
addition for every ω ∈ Ω and almost all t ∈ T , e(t , ω)  0, then the weak fine
core of E coincides with the set of competitive allocations of E ∗.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem C, noticing that E ∗ is irreducible
and the Theorem of Vind (1972) holds under the assumptions of Proposition 5.3.

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